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Background: We evaluated if interventions aimed at air travellers can delay local SARS-CoV-2 
community transmission in a previously unaffected country. 
Methods: We simulated infected air travellers arriving into countries with no sustained SARS-
CoV-2 transmission or other introduction routes from affected regions. We assessed the 
effectiveness of syndromic screening at departure and/or arrival & traveller sensitisation to the 
COVID-2019-like symptoms with the aim to trigger rapid self-isolation and reporting on symptom 
onset to enable contact tracing. We assumed that syndromic screening would reduce the 
number of infected arrivals and that traveller sensitisation reduces the average number of 
secondary cases. We use stochastic simulations to account for uncertainty in both arrival and 
secondary infections rates, and present sensitivity analyses on arrival rates of infected travellers 
and the effectiveness of traveller sensitisation. We report the median expected delay achievable 
in each scenario and an inner 50% interval.  
Results: Under baseline assumptions, introducing exit and entry screening in combination with 
traveller sensitisation can delay a local SARS-CoV-2 outbreak by 8 days (50% interval: 3-14 
days) when the rate of importation is 1 infected traveller per week at time of introduction. The 
additional benefit of entry screening is small if exit screening is effective: the combination of only 
exit screening and traveller sensitisation can delay an outbreak by 7 days (50% interval: 2-13 
days). In the absence of screening, with less effective sensitisation, or a higher rate of 
importation, these delays shrink rapidly to less than 4 days. 
Conclusion: Syndromic screening and traveller sensitisation in combination may have 
marginally delayed SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in unaffected countries. 
 
Background 
Similar to outbreaks of other respiratory pathogens 1–4, syndromic airport screening at arrival of 
travellers from regions with a high risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection is unlikely to identify a sufficient 
proportion of infected travellers to prevent global spread 5,6   Sensitising arriving travellers to the 
symptoms and risk of SARS-CoV-2 and encouraging appropriate reactions (e.g., early self-
isolation, requesting medical assistance via telephone, reporting travel history to providers to 
trigger tracing and quarantine of contacts), may have a more pronounced effect and has been 
implemented in many transport hubs 7. Unfortunately, with increasing numbers of infected 
travellers contact tracing is unlikely to be sustainable for long because of the immensely 
resource-intensive nature of contact tracing and hence is similarly unlikely to prevent local 
transmission in the long term 8.  
 
Even if containment is ultimately impossible, delaying local spread remains a key target of 
pandemic response 9. This will allow additional time for preparation of the health system and 
mobilisation of additional public health resources. Delaying local spread will also allow for 



























We aim to estimate the effectiveness of syndromic screening and traveller sensitisation for 
delaying the onset of sustained SARS-CoV-2 spread in previously unaffected regions. 
 
Methods 
Infected Traveller Arrivals Model 
We represent the potential importation of infections by a non-homogeneous Poisson process 
with intensity function,     , representing the instantaneous rate of arrival of infected travellers 
(per week), and that the travellers are attempting to travel to a specific country or region 
currently not experiencing an outbreak. Implicitly, the number of infected travellers is a product 
of the prevalence and the number of travellers per week. We assume that individuals with 
severe symptoms do not attempt to travel, though travellers may develop severe symptoms en 
route 6.  
 
For early stages of an outbreak, with sufficient control measures in place at the source of the 
outbreak to flatten or reverse the spread, it may be reasonable to assume a constant arrival 
rate. Instead we assume that      grows from an initial rate,   infected travellers per week, 
when measures to limit the spread from imported cases are introduced. The assumed 
exponential growth rate of       (95% CI, 0.050-0.16) corresponds to an epidemic doubling 
time of 7.4 days (95% interval: 4.2-14 days), in line with the local epidemic growth during 
attempted control via contact tracing but without a lockdown 10. We consider that the epidemic 
grows exponentially at the source during the early phase of the outbreak when the population is 
effectively entirely susceptible. In addition to their use in modelling the risk of exportation of 
SARS-CoV-2 11 and turning points for daily case trends in SARS-CoV 12, non-homogeneous 
Poisson processes, particularly those with decreasing inter-arrival times, have previously been 
applied to a range of infectious disease settings for investigating the effectiveness of border 
control 13, estimating epidemic parameters 14 and assessing scheduling in mass immunisation 
clinics for pandemic Influenza 15. 
Outbreak Probability Model 
Upon arrival, we assume all infected travellers have the same distribution of the number of 
onwards infections they would generate if circulating in the community. These potential 
secondary infections are determined by the average number of those infections,   , the basic 
reproduction number, and the dispersion of that number,  . 
 
Following Hartfield and Alizon 16, we calculate the probability that an arriving infected traveller 
causes an outbreak, given    and dispersion parameter, , by solving the first equation in their 
Supplementary Material S.3, 
 































for    the probability that an outbreak is triggered by an arriving traveller (Hartfield and Alizon 
parameterise this in terms of      the probability of extinction of an outbreak). 
 
Having obtained   for a given simulation we calculate   , the number of infected travellers 
required to trigger the outbreak from a geometric distribution with probability  , sampling  the 
         quantile of said distribution to match initial conditions between intervention scenarios 
across simulation samples.  We assume that the arrival times of infected travellers follows a 
non-homogeneous Poisson process with intensity         
    , where      is the arrival rate 
of infected travellers (per day) when the interventions are introduced at     and the rate of 
increase,  , is sampled from a Gamma distribution with 95% interval (0.05, 0.16) representing 
the growth early in the Wuhan outbreak 10. Additionally, because    is uncertain, this leads to 
uncertainty in q and variability in    beyond the stochasticity from the arrival process.  This 
exponential growth rate is consistent with a case doubling times of: 5 days (95% interval: 4.3, 
6.2 days) found by Ferretti et al. 17 which would give a growth rate of approximately 0.14; and 
that of 6.4 days (5.8, 7.1 days) by Wu et al. 18 giving a growth rate of 0.11 days. We have 
chosen to parameterise in terms of the exponential growth rate of the epidemic rather than the 
doubling time of cases to account for recovery at the travel origin. 
Model of symptom screening and sensitisation 
When syndromic screening is implemented, each arriving infected traveller is identified during 
screening with probability    , reducing the number of infected travellers arriving and 
potentially delaying the outbreak. For the scenarios we consider, we assume the same baseline 
assumptions as in Quilty et al 6; i.e. a syndromic screening sensitivity of 86%, travel duration of 
12 hours, and average times from infection to onset of symptoms and from onset to severe 
symptoms/hospitalisation as 5.2 and 9.2 days, respectively. For those assumptions, Quilty et al 
estimate the mean probability of SARS-CoV-2 infected travellers not being detected at either 
exit or entry screening as 46% and as 42% for exit-only screening. Here we consider the 
uncertainty in θ by bootstrap resampling 100 travellers per simulation from the model of Quilty 
et al. and obtain 95% confidence intervals of (33%, 53%) and (37%, 57%) respectively. As in 
that paper, the benefit of entry screening is dependent on the effectiveness of exit screening, 
and entry-only screening is likely to pick up those who would have been identified by exit 
screening. 
 
Sensitisation occurs via, e.g., posters and handouts to travellers arriving from high risk regions, 
which increases the likelihood that those travellers, if they experience SARS-CoV-2 symptoms, 
will self-isolate on the occurrence of mild symptoms and rapidly report to health care providers 
who in turn trigger contact tracing 8. We represent traveller sensitisation as reducing    to 
          , where   is interpreted as the effectiveness of sensitisation, rather than the 
proportion of passengers perfectly sensitised. The lower    results in a lower probability that an 
arriving infected traveller triggers an outbreak,    , and therefore it may require the entry of more 
infected travellers,     , to trigger the outbreak than in the no-sensitisation case, resulting in 


























As a base case for the intervention, we consider recent work 5 which indicates that sensitisation 
by itself may cause only 25% of those symptomatically infected with SARS-CoV-2 to self-report 
upon onset of symptoms. In line with Hellewell et al 8 we assume, for sensitivity, a best case 
scenario that these measures accelerate self-isolation and reporting in the early stages of the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and reduce the average number of onward transmitting secondary 
infections by about 50%. 
Calculation of delays to reach outbreak threshold 
To determine the impact of the interventions, we calculate the difference in time to outbreak 
occurrence with and without interventions:      . For the correct comparison, these times must 
be drawn as matched quantiles,         . To ensure that, we calculate    and    from the 
same    draw (reduced to    by sensitisation and contact tracing ) and calculate the probability 
of an individual traveller causing an outbreak without and with interventions,   and   , 
respectively. We then generate arrival times from Poisson processes with rate      and 
determine how long it takes for   infected travellers to arrive in the base case and    to arrive in 
the screened queue. Arrival times are generated using the reda package 19 in R 3.6.2. 
 
The expected arrival day for the  th infected traveller in the no-intervention case, given      is 
calculated by integrating the exponentially increasing intensity,       
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 ). The 
expected arrival day of the   th infected traveller under the intervention is 
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Where    is less than 1,    is infinite and the simulated outbreak does not occur as the infected 
traveller causing the outbreak will never arrive. 
 
We report the median delay and inner 50% and 95% intervals and plot the empirical 
complementary cumulative probability densities to show how many simulations result in a delay 
of at least a given duration given         . 
 
Scenarios considered 
We considered three syndromic screening intervention scenarios: no screening, exit-only, and 
exit-and-entry screening. We further considered two scenarios of the effectiveness of traveller 
sensitisation: 0% and a reasonable average case of 25%. No screening and 0% sensitisation 
effectiveness form the non-intervention reference. These are reported in the context of either 
0.1, 1, 10 or 100 infected travellers per week at the time of measures being introduced. We 
assume that the mean   is gamma distributed with an inner 95% range from 1.4 to 3.9 
10; we 
assume, for the calculation of probability of outbreak triggering, the dispersion in secondary 
cases is k=0.54 20. 
 
For sensitivity analyses, we also investigate alternative scenarios for the dispersion of   and a 
reasonable best case of 50% effectiveness of contact tracing and self-reporting. All scenarios 






























Table 1: Overview of parameter assumptions for the model. 
 
Parameter Value Source 
R0, basic reproduction 
number 
Central 95% range is 1.4 to 3.9  
Gamma distributed,               
 10 
λ0, rate of arrival of infected 
travellers (individuals per 
week) at time when 
interventions are introduced  
0.1, 1, or 10 or 100 assumption 
θ, probability that infected 
traveller is not detected by 
screening  
Exit screening only:  
46% (95%CI: 37%, 57%) 
Entry and exit screening: 
42% (95%CI: 33%, 53%) 
No screening: 100% (100%, 100%) 
6 
ρ, effectiveness of traveller 
sensitisation 
0%, 25%,  
Sensitivity analyses: 50% 
5,8 
 , epidemic growth rate (per 
day)  
Central 95% range is 0.05 to 0.16  
Gamma distributed,               
10 
    , probability of outbreak 
caused by a single infected 
traveller (without and with 
intervention, respectively) 
Solution to Eq. 1 with    for   and 
       for    
16 
  , number of infected 
arrivals required to trigger an 
outbreak in absence of 
interventions 
         quantile of a geometric 
distribution with probability   
Derived 
  , number of infected 
arrivals required to trigger an 
outbreak in presence of 
interventions 
         quantile (matched to above) 
of a geometric distribution with 
probability    
Derived 
     , arrival time for the 
infected traveller who triggers 
an outbreak, without and with 
interventions 
Poisson process with intensity      
   


























k, dispersion parameter for 
number of secondary 
infections 
0.54 







Figure 1: Schematic of the air traveller intervention process. A proportion of infected travellers (red dots) will be 
detected through syndromic exit or entry screening (green arrows) and will immediately be isolated and not cause 
secondary cases (yellow dots) in the as yet unaffected destination. Travellers not identified by syndromic screening 
enter the destination country (red arrows), where they are provided by sensitisation information and are more likely to 
self-isolate and/or report their symptoms soon after onset and cause fewer secondary cases (dots which are yellow 
under ―delayed contact tracing‖ but grey under ―rapid contact tracing‖). 
 
Results 
For all scenarios investigated, the lower bound of the 95% interval is always less than 1 day of 
delay (Table 2). Where sensitisation has been performed (  either 25% or 50%), the sampled 
value of    may be less than 1; for such values, the outbreak is averted. Where the upper bound 
of the 95% interval is infinite, this indicates that at least 2.5% of outbreaks have been averted. 
Here we present results in terms of their median and inner 50% interval and only present the 
upper bounds of the 95% interval when they are finite. The percentage of outbreaks averted for 
all combinations of  and   are given in Table S1. 
 
In the case of 1 infected traveller per week at the time of the intervention, the combination of 

























50% interval: 3-14 days) (Table 2, Figure 2). If there are 10 infected travellers per week at the 
time of these interventions being introduced, the outbreak is typically delayed by only 2 days 
(50%: <1-5 days). At       the median delay is less than 1 day, and less than 25% of delays 
are longer than 1 day.  
 
Additional figures in the appendix show the complementary cumulative density functions, 
focusing on either variation with screening (Figure S1), traveller sensitisation (Figure S2),  
arrival rate (Figure S3), or dispersion parameter (Figure S4). 
 
The incremental benefit of syndromic entry screening is highly dependent on the effectiveness 
of exit screening. With one infected traveller per week, traveller sensitisation, and under 
baseline assumptions of exit screening effectiveness but no entry screening, the outbreak is 
delayed by 2 days (50%: <1-13 days), indicating that additional entry screening adds little in this 
case.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics providing the inner 50% and 95% confidence intervals and medians (all rounded to the 
nearest day) for the estimated number of days an outbreak is delayed given one arriving infection per week at the 
introduction of an intervention consisting of a combination of traveller screening and sensitisation and contact tracing. 
Comparisons are made to no contact tracing and no screening (there are no ―No screening‖ results at 0% 
sensitisation as this is the baseline against which comparisons are to be made). 
 
 
Arrivals/week,   
 
Sensitisation,   
 
Screening 
Number of days for which the given percentage of delays are at 
least this long 
97.5% 75% 50% 25% 2.5% 
0.1 0% Exit and entry <1 <1 6 13 41 
Exit only <1 <1 5 12 41 
25% Exit and entry <1 4 12 22 ∞ 
Exit only <1 3 10 20 ∞ 
No screening <1 <1 1 7 ∞ 
1 0% Exit and entry <1 <1 4 9 23 
Exit only <1 <1 3 8 21 
25% Exit and entry <1 3 8 14 ∞ 
Exit only <1 2 7 13 ∞ 

























10 0% Exit and entry <1 <1 1 3 8 
Exit only <1 <1 1 2 7 
25% Exit and entry <1 <1 2 5 ∞ 
Exit only <1 <1 2 4 ∞ 
No screening <1 <1 <1 1 ∞ 
100 0% Exit and entry <1 <1 <1 <1 1 
Exit only <1 <1 <1 <1 1 
25% Exit and entry <1 <1 <1 1 ∞ 
Exit only <1 <1 <1 1 ∞ 




We estimate that with no traveller sensitisation and under baseline assumptions for the 
effectiveness of syndromic screening at exit and entry, the delays are half as long as if the effect 
of sensitisation was 25%. In the early stages of the outbreak with 1 infected traveller per week 
at the time the intervention is introduced, an outbreak may be delayed by screening alone by 
only 4 days (50%: <1-9 days). Again, this is largely due to exit screening at departure, which on 
its own is estimated to delay the outbreak by 3 days (50%: <1-8 days). Forgoing screening 
measures until a rate of arrival of 10 infected travellers per week, essentially eliminates any 
potential delay in onset of a local outbreak; specifically, if infected traveller numbers approach 
10 per week, syndromic screening alone can only delay the outbreak by 1 day (50%: <1-3 
days).  
 
Similarly, we estimate that in the absence of syndromic air traveller screening, traveller 
sensitisation can only delay the outbreak by 1 day (50%:<1-4 days) early in the epidemic when 
the arrival rate is 1 infected traveller per week at time of introduction of the intervention. When 
the rate of arrival at time of introducing only sensitisation is 10 infected travellers per week, the 
introduction of sensitisation results in delays of less than 1 day (50%: <1-1 day) and that at 100 
infected arrivals per week there is no delay unless the outbreak is completely averted (only the 
case for 13% of simulated outbreaks).   
 
For sensitivity analyses, we varied the effectiveness of traveller sensitisation and the 
heterogeneity in the number of secondary infections. A 50% reduction in the effective 

























tracing can potentially prevent a local outbreak independent of the number of infected arrivals if 
the basic reproduction number is smaller than 2.0 (i.e.,               ). As traveller 
sensitisation increases and therefore a greater proportion of simulated    values are less than 1, 
the proportion of simulated delays that are infinitely long (indicating that that specific simulated 
potential outbreak has been averted) increases to nearly 66% (Table S1).  
 
If the number of secondary infections is substantially less disperse, e.g. influenza-like, fewer 
outbreaks are averted, and median outbreak delays decrease by about 25%, as the outbreak 
becomes less reliant on occasional super-spreading events (Figure S4). If, however, the 
number of secondary infections is slightly more disperse, i.e. the dispersion parameter estimate 
of 0.1 23, then outbreak delays are also approximately 25% shorter but fewer outbreaks are 






























Figure 2: Complementary empirical cumulative density functions for the estimated number of days an outbreak is 
delayed given an intervention consisting of a combination of traveller screening and sensitisation and contact tracing. 
Rows correspond to different arrival rates and columns to traveller sensitisation. Comparisons are made to no contact 
tracing and no screening (there are no ―No screening‖ results at 0% sensitisation as this is the baseline against which 
comparisons are to be made). 
 
Discussion 
Syndromic screening of air travellers at departure and/or arrival is unlikely to prevent a sufficient 
proportion of SARS-CoV-2 infected travellers from entering a yet unaffected country and 
thereby prevent a local outbreak. Similarly, sensitisation of travellers from high-risk countries to 
encourage self-isolation and enable accelerated case detection and contact tracing if indeed 

























travellers arrive undetected, unless the effect of sensitisation is large enough ensure that the 
number of secondary infections are, on average, less than 1 for the traveller and subsequent 
cases. We investigate here how syndromic screening and traveller sensitisation, as well as their 
combination, may delay an outbreak of SARS-CoV-2. 
 
We find that when syndromic screening alone is introduced very early in the outbreak, i.e. at a 
point when 0.1 infected travellers per week arrive, it can only slightly delay an outbreak (6 days, 
50%: <1-13 days). Traveller sensitisation alone has a less pronounced effect by delaying the 
outbreak by 1 day (50%: <1-7 days). The combination of syndromic screening and traveller 
sensitisation may more substantially delay an outbreak while the number of infected travellers is 
this low (12 days, 50%: 4-22). The incremental effect of syndromic entry screening is only 
notable if exit screening is poor or even absent. These results are sensitive to a number of key 
assumptions: with increasing R0, less heterogeneous R0 or less effective traveller sensitisation 
the estimated achievable delay quickly becomes negligible. Furthermore, once the weekly 
number of infected passengers increases to 10 and above, e.g. as a result of an exponential 
increase in cases at the origin of travel, even the combination of syndromic screening and 
traveller sensitisation delays is unlikely to delay an outbreak for more than a week. 
 
We find a potential small role for interventions targeting air-passengers to delay major outbreaks 
of SARS-CoV-2 in previously unaffected regions as long as implemented very early in an 
outbreak. We find that syndromic screening on arrival can add to the effect of traveller 
sensitisation in these early stages of a pandemic. Syndromic screening can also aid to reduce 
the number of passengers that would eventually self-report and then require resource-intensive 
follow up, including contact tracing. As the rate of infected arrivals increases, contact tracing 
becomes increasingly more difficult and the effectiveness is likely to decrease, further 
shortening the achievable delays. Therefore, syndromic screening may have an additional role 
in helping to sustain control efforts for longer. Of note, however, is that syndromic screening at 
arrival only substantially adds to control efforts if syndromic screening at departure is absent or 
largely ineffective. 
 
Delays in airport processes arising from screening may expose travellers to additional risk 
depending on airport design and reduction in pedestrian flow rates within the terminal and 
therefore the amount of time passengers spend waiting in crowded areas 24 as well as the time 
spent boarding and alighting 25. While not as long in duration as the flight itself, during their time 
in terminals, travellers mix with a much larger and more diverse range of people than during the 
flight. This is outside the scope of this study, however, and relies on assumptions about 
background prevalence in the community of airport users and mixing within airports. 
 
While our findings may encourage implementation of both syndromic screening on entry and 
traveller sensitisation in the early stages of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, it is important to note 
that these findings are highly sensitive to the underlying base-case assumptions and do not 
consider the economic implications of large scale air passenger screening and contact tracing 

























ongoing economic health) is more important a goal during a pandemic than short-term 
budgetary considerations 27 particularly in the absence of a vaccine. 
 
Wells et al. 28 focus on the risk of exporting, rather than importing, the virus and estimate the risk 
of exportation from China to another country given weights based on airline movements and 
distributions of incubation time. They considered the impact of travel and border restrictions and 
found that these restrictions decreased the daily rate of exportation from mainland China to 
other countries by 81% in the three weeks after introduction, and averted 71% of the cases that 
they estimated would have occurred had no lockdown been introduced. This would provide 
countries without established outbreaks to take measures to further delay, e.g. screening, 
sensitisation and contact tracing, as well as preparing their health systems for the outbreak 7,29.  
 
With increasing numbers of infected travellers, a higher number of secondary infections or a 
lower heterogeneity thereof, or less effective interventions, the achievable delay quickly drops 
down to a few days of delay. While all of our assumptions include the best knowledge on SARS-
CoV-2 to date, there is considerable uncertainty associated with all of these assumptions. For 
example, we have assumed recently reported heterogeneity in the individual R0, however, the 
reported range of uncertainty includes SARS-like and influenza-like which can drastically alter 
the results. Some recent estimates would suggest more SARS-like or even more overdispersed 
k which would imply that longer outbreak delays are possible as shown in our sensitivity 
analysis 30. We also don’t explicitly account for potential asymptomatic transmission. However, 
we implicitly do so as both the syndromic screening as well as the contact tracing work that 
informed our estimates accounted for a small proportion of asymptomatic transmitters who we 
assume similarly transmit but will not be affected by syndromic screening or sensitisation. 
Furthermore, the results are predicated on a syndromic screening sensitivity of 86% 6. When 
reducing the sensitivity to 70%, as used in other reports 5, delays reduce by about 20%. 
 
Travel restrictions were implemented in the form of flights exiting China being suspended 31, 
which has potentially curbed the exponential increase of infected travellers despite an 
exponential increase of infections in China. Assuming exponential growth with      numbers 
of infected arrivals would have increased from 1 to 10 and 100 per week within about 23 and 46 
days respectively (assuming exponential growth with      ) and estimated delays would 
decrease accordingly. However, infected traveller arrivals likely still have increased 
exponentially as a result of the largely undetected spread in Iran and Italy 32 early on in the 
pandemic (increasing, respectively, from 28 and 76 cases as of 23 Feb. 2020 33 to 593 and 1128 
a week later on 1 Mar. 2020 34).  
 
By February, many major airlines had suspended flights from mainland China with travel 
restrictions from Iran, Italy and Korea being added more recently. In the three weeks leading up 
to the 28th February the UK reported 10 imported cases, 4 of them in the final week 35. At that 
early point a more optimistic scenario would have been that the control measures in place limit 
the number of infected travellers and may sustainably do so for a considerable amount of time. 
This constant rate of importation, which is more similar to e.g. SARS in 2003 would have led to 


























Future pandemic threats will bear similar questions. While our considerations are focussed 
around SARS-CoV-2 prevention there are some generally applicable conclusions. The expected 
delay of a local outbreak as a result of traveller targeted interventions will depend on the 
pathogen specific epidemiology but potential pre- and asymptomatic transmission are a key 
challenge to the success of such. Further, for pathogens with long incubation period, syndromic 
screening is likely to miss many infected passengers and a high reproduction number increases 
the chance that a single missed infected will trigger a local outbreak.  
 
In summary, we find that the targeting of air-travellers with syndromic screening at exit or entry 
and sensitisation for signs of symptoms following their arrival has likely delayed the  local 
spread of SARS-CoV-2, but only by a few days. This is because measures were largely put in 
place at a time where already a few infected travellers a week were arriving and that infection 
prevalence among travellers was likely increasing exponentially. We find that syndromic 
screening at arrival may enhance control efforts, but only in the absence of syndromic screening 
at departure.  
 
References 
1.  Mabey D, Flasche S, Edmunds WJ. Airport screening for Ebola. BMJ. 2014 Oct 
14;349:g6202. 
2.  Khan K, Eckhardt R, Brownstein JS, et al. Entry and exit screening of airline travellers 
during the A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic: a retrospective evaluation. Bull World Health Organ. 
2013 May 1;91(5):368–76. 
3.  Cowling BJ, Lau LLH, Wu P, et al. Entry screening to delay local transmission of 2009 
pandemic influenza A (H1N1). BMC Infect Dis. 2010 Mar 30;10:82. 
4.  Bitar D, Goubar A, Desenclos JC. International travels and fever screening during 
epidemics: a literature review on the effectiveness and potential use of non-contact infrared 
thermometers. Euro Surveill Bull Eur Sur Mal Transm Eur Commun Dis Bull. 2009 Feb 
12;14(6). 
5.  Gostic K, Gomez AC, Mummah RO, et al. Estimated effectiveness of symptom and risk 
screening to prevent the spread of COVID-19. eLife. 2020 24;9. 
6.  Quilty BJ, Clifford S, Flasche S, et al. Effectiveness of airport screening at detecting 
travellers infected with novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Euro Surveill Bull Eur Sur Mal 
Transm Eur Commun Dis Bull. 2020;25(5). 
7.  Wong JEL, Leo YS, Tan CC. COVID-19 in Singapore—Current Experience: Critical Global 
Issues That Require Attention and Action. JAMA. 2020 Apr 7;323(13):1243–4. 
8.  Hellewell J, Abbott S, Gimma A, et al. Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreaks by 
isolation of cases and contacts. Lancet Glob Health. 2020;8(4):e488–96. 
9.  Fukuda K, World Health Organization, editors. Pandemic influenza preparedness and 
response: a WHO guidance document. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2009. 58 p. 
10.  Li Q, Guan X, Wu P, et al. Early Transmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel 
Coronavirus-Infected Pneumonia. N Engl J Med. 2020 26;382(13):1199–207. 
11.  Du Z, Wang L, Cauchemez S, et al. Risk for Transportation of Coronavirus Disease from 
Wuhan to Other Cities in China. Emerg Infect Dis [Internet]. 2020 May 20 [cited 2020 Apr 
19];26(5). Available from: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/5/20-0146_article 

























process. Stat Med. 2006 Jun 15;25(11):1826–39. 
13.  Scalia Tomba G, Wallinga J. A simple explanation for the low impact of border control as a 
countermeasure to the spread of an infectious disease. Math Biosci. 2008 Aug;214(1–
2):70–2. 
14.  Wang L, Wu JT. Characterizing the dynamics underlying global spread of epidemics. Nat 
Commun. 2018 Jan 15;9(1):218. 
15.  Beeler MF, Aleman DM, Carter MW. A simulation case study to improve staffing decisions 
at mass immunization clinics for pandemic influenza. J Oper Res Soc. 2014 Apr 
1;65(4):497–511. 
16.  Hartfield M, Alizon S. Introducing the Outbreak Threshold in Epidemiology. PLoS Pathog 
[Internet]. 2013 Jun 6 [cited 2020 Apr 19];9(6). Available from: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3680036/ 
17.  Ferretti L, Wymant C, Kendall M, et al. Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests 
epidemic control with digital contact tracing. Science. 2020 Mar 31;eabb6936. 
18.  Wu JT, Leung K, Leung GM. Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and 
international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling 
study. The Lancet. 2020 Feb 29;395(10225):689–97. 
19.  Wang W, Fu H, Yan J. reda: Recurrent Event Data Analysis [Internet]. 2019 [cited 2020 Apr 
19]. Available from: https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=reda 
20.  Riou J, Althaus CL. Pattern of early human-to-human transmission of Wuhan 2019 novel 
coronavirus (2019-nCoV), December 2019 to January 2020. Eurosurveillance. 2020 Jan 
30;25(4):2000058. 
21.  R Core Team. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing [Internet]. R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing; Available from: https://www.R-project.org/ 
22.  Lloyd-Smith JO, Schreiber SJ, Kopp PE, Getz WM. Superspreading and the effect of 
individual variation on disease emergence. Nature. 2005 Nov 17;438(7066):355–9. 
23.  Endo A, Centre for the Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases COVID-19 Working 
Group, Abbott S, et al. Estimating the overdispersion in COVID-19 transmission using 
outbreak sizes outside China. Wellcome Open Res. 2020 Apr 9;5:67. 
24.  Kalakou S, Moura F, Medeiros V. Analysis of airport configuration and passenger behaviour. 
In 2015. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338900751 
25.  Derjany P, Namilae S, Mubayi A, et al. Effect of pedestrian movement on the spread of 
infectious diseases during air travel: a modeling study. In National Science Foundation; 
2017. 
26.  Lee VJ, Chiew CJ, Khong WX. Interrupting transmission of COVID-19: lessons from 
containment efforts in Singapore. J Travel Med [Internet]. [cited 2020 Apr 19]; Available 
from: https://academic.oup.com/jtm/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jtm/taaa039/5804843 
27.  The Lancet. COVID-19: too little, too late? Lancet Lond Engl. 2020;395(10226):755. 
28.  Wells CR, Sah P, Moghadas SM, et al. Impact of international travel and border control 
measures on the global spread of the novel 2019 coronavirus outbreak. Proc Natl Acad Sci. 
2020 Mar 31;117(13):7504–9. 
29.  World Health Organisation. Critical preparedness, readiness and response actions for 
COVID-19 [Internet]. [cited 2020 Apr 19]. Available from: https://www.who.int/publications-
detail/critical-preparedness-readiness-and-response-actions-for-covid-19 
30.  Grantz, K, Metcalf, J, Lessler, J. Dispersion vs. Control [Internet]. [cited 2020 Feb 12]. 
Available from: https://hopkinsidd.github.io/nCoV-Sandbox/DispersionExploration.html 
31.  Pogkas D, Sam C, Whiteaker C. Flights Worldwide Suspended by the Coronavirus 
Outbreak. Bloomberg [Internet]. 2020 Mar 13 [cited 2020 Apr 19]; Available from: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-china-coronavirus-airlines-business-effects/ 
32.  Grasselli G, Pesenti A, Cecconi M. Critical Care Utilization for the COVID-19 Outbreak in 

























[Internet]. 2020 Mar 13 [cited 2020 Apr 20]; Available from: 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2763188 
33.  World Health Organisation. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report - 34 
[Internet]. World Health Organization; 2020. Available from: 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200223-sitrep-34-
covid-19.pdf 
34.  World Health Organisation. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report - 41 
[Internet]. World Health Organization; 2020. Available from: 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200301-sitrep-41-
covid-19.pdf 
35.  World Health Organisation. Novel Coronavirus(2019-nCoV) Situation Report - 21 [Internet]. 




We declare no competing interests. 
 
Acknowledgements 
SF and SC are supported by a Sir Henry Dale Fellowship jointly funded by the Wellcome Trust 
and the Royal Society (Grant number 208812/Z/17/Z). RME acknowledges an HDR UK 
Innovation Fellowship (Grant number MR/S003975/1). BQ was funded by the National Institute 
for Health Research (NIHR) (16/137/109) using UK aid from the UK Government to support 
global health research. PK was funded by the Royal Society under award RP\EA\180004 and by 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (INV-003174). KvZ is supported by Elrha’s Research for 
Health in Humanitarian Crises (R2HC) Programme, which aims to improve health outcomes by 
strengthening the evidence base for public health interventions in humanitarian crises. The 
R2HC programme is funded by the UK Government (DFID), the Wellcome Trust, and the UK 
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR). CABP gratefully acknowledges funding by the 
Department for International Development / Wellcome Epidemic Preparedness Coronavirus 
research programme (ref. 221303/Z/20/Z) and by the NTD Modelling Consortium by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1184344). 
 
The following funding sources are acknowledged as providing funding for the working group 
authors. Alan Turing Institute (AE). BBSRC LIDP (BB/M009513/1: DS). This research was partly 
funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (INV-003174: KP, MJ, YL; NTD Modelling 
Consortium OPP1184344: GM; OPP1180644: SRP; OPP1183986: ESN; OPP1191821: KO'R, 
MA). ERC Starting Grant (#757688: CJVA, KEA; #757699: JCE, RMGJH). This project has 
received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme 
- project EpiPose (101003688: KP, MJ, WJE, YL). This research was partly funded by the 
Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project 'RECAP' managed through RCUK and 
ESRC (ES/P010873/1: AG, CIJ). Nakajima Foundation (AE). This research was partly funded 

























support global health research (16/137/109: CD, FYS, MJ, YL; Health Protection Research Unit 
for Modelling Methodology HPRU-2012-10096: NGD, TJ; PR-OD-1017-20002: AR). The views 
expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR or 
the UK Department of Health and Social Care. RCUK/ESRC (ES/P010873/1: TJ). Royal Society 
(Dorothy Hodgkin Fellowship: RL). UK DHSC/UK Aid/NIHR (ITCRZ 03010: HPG). UK MRC (LID 
DTP MR/N013638/1: EMR, QJL; MR/P014658/1: GMK). Authors of this research receive 
funding from UK Public Health Rapid Support Team funded by the United Kingdom Department 
of Health and Social Care (TJ). Wellcome Trust (206250/Z/17/Z: AJK, TWR; 210758/Z/18/Z: 
JDM, JH, NIB, SA, SFunk, SRM). No funding (AKD, AMF, DCT, SH). 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of 
the NIHR, the UK Department of Health and Social Care or any of the other listed funding 
sources. 
 
We would like to thank Annelies Wilder-Smith for her helpful comments during the conception of 
this work. 
 
Neither patients nor the public were involved with the design, conduct, reporting, or 
dissemination plans of our research. As this work is a simulation study, there are no participants 








/taaa068/5834629 by guest on 17 M
ay 2020
